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Abstract
We study a business cycle model in which a benevolent scal authority must determine the
optimal provision of government services, while lacking credibility, lump-sum taxes, and the
ability to bond nance decits. Households and the scal authority have risk sensitive pref-
erences. We nd that outcomes are a¤ected importantly by the households risk sensitivity,
but not by the scal authoritys. Further, while household risk-sensitivity induces a strong
precautionary saving motive, which raises capital and lowers the return on assets, its e¤ects on
uctuations and the business cycle are generally small, although more pronounced for negative
shocks. Holding the stochastic steady state constant, increases in household risk-sensitivity
lower the risk-free rate and raise the return on equity, increasing the equity premium. Finally,
although risk-sensitivity has little e¤ect on the provision of government services, it does cause
the scal authority to lower the income tax rate. An additional contribution of this paper is
to present a method for computing Markov-perfect equilibria in models where private agents
and the government are risk-sensitive decisionmakers.
Keywords: Asset prices, business cycles, risk-sensitivity, Markov-Perfect scal policy.
JEL Classication: E63, C61.
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1 Introduction
Risk-sensitive preferences are used increasingly to study questions related to consumption risk,
welfare, and asset pricing. Often motivated in the context of the Ellsberg paradox, such prefer-
ences can be derived from ambiguity aversion or by concerns for robustness to model misspeci-
cation (Hansen and Sargent, 2008) and represent a special case of Epstein and Zin (1989) pref-
erences. Placing risk-sensitive households in a real business cycle model, Tallarini (2000) shows
that business cycle uctuations can have large welfare e¤ects and that the model can generate a
low risk-free rate. Related work by Croce (2006) nds that stylized facts about the risk-free rate
and the equity premium can be accounted for in a stochastic growth model containing capital
adjustment costs when households have Epstein-Zin preferences.
In this paper, we consider the problem facing a benevolent scal authority that must formulate
and conduct scal policy in an environment in which households and rms are optimizing. In this
economy, the scal authority taxes linearly household income in order to nance the provision
of government services, while lacking a commitment technology and the ability to bond-nance
decits. Households exhibit the standard aversion to risk in consumption and leisure (and gov-
ernment services), but they are additionally assumed to be risk-sensitive decisionmakers, averse
to risk in expected future utility. We use this model as a laboratory to investigate the e¤ects that
risk-sensitive preferences have on the business cycle, asset prices, and the provision of government
services in a Markov-perfect equilibrium.
We nd that household risk-sensitivity, but not scal-authority risk-sensitivity, induces a
strong precautionary saving motive, which raises importantly the stochastic steady state level
of capital. Further, although household risk-sensitivity e¤ects the stochastic steady state, its
e¤ects on economic volatility are small, a nding that is consistent with Tallarini (2000). At the
same time, we nd that although risk-sensitivity has little e¤ect on how the economy responds
to positive technology shocks, its e¤ects for the case of negative technology shocks are more
pronounced. In addition, due to its e¤ect on capitals stochastic steady state, we show that
increases in household risk-sensitivity serve to lower the risk-free rate, the return to equity, and the
equity premium. However, holding the stochastic steady state constant, increases in household
risk-sensitivity lower the risk-free rate slightly, raise the return on equity slightly, and increase
the equity premium. But, the increase in the equity premium produced is small, suggesting that
risk-sensitive preferences, in isolation, leave much of any observed equity premium unexplained,
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consistent with Croce (2006). Finally, although risk-sensitivity has little e¤ect on the provision
of government services, it does cause the scal authority to lower the income tax rate.
As noted above, the scal authority in our model lacks the ability to commit. For this reason,
the equilibria that we study are Markov-perfect rather than Ramsey. In this respect, our study
is related to work by authors such as Ortigueira (2006), Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2008),
Ambler and Pelgrin (2010), and Martin (2010), who also study Markov-perfect scal policy in
balanced budget economies with capital.1 Unlike Ortigueira (2006), Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull
(2008), and Martin (2010), however, the model we study is stochastic, allows for risk-sensitive
preferences, and we focus on the business cycle and asset pricing rather than on steady state
outcomes. And, where Ambler and Pelgrin (2010) do solve a model that is stochastic, they do
not allow households to make a labor-leisure choice or allow for risk-sensitive preferences. Our
analysis is most closely related to Tallarini (2000), who studies business cycles, asset prices, and
welfare in a real business cycle model in which households are risk-sensitive. We di¤er from
Tallarini (2000) in that our model contains a scal authority, and in that it considers Markov-
perfect scal policy. We also di¤er from Tallarini (2000) in that our model allows both households
and the scal authority to be risk-sensitive decisionmakers, in that we focus on transitory rather
than permanent shocks, and in that we compute equilibria using a global method.2
One novel aspect of our model is that households and the scal-authority are each risk-
sensitive decisionmakers. As is well-known (Hansen and Sargent, 2008), this risk-sensitivity can
alternatively be motivated by ambiguity aversion or by robustness considerations, allowing us to
remain agnostic about its precise motivation. There are very few papers that analyze models
in which multiple agents are risk-sensitive, but Svec (2012) provides a notable example. Svec
(2012) examines Ramsey equilibria in a Lucas and Stokey (1983) economy in which households
are robust decisionmakers and in which the scal authority can be either political (maximize
household welfare under the households subjective probability model) or paternalistic (max-
imize household welfare under the true probability model).3 Svecs political and paternalistic
1Our study is also related to the body of work that examines Markov-perfect and/or Ramsey equilibria in models
that exclude capital (such as Stockman (2001), Chugh (2006), and Niemann, Pichler, and Sorger (2008, 2009)).
And it is related to literature that examines the optimal nancing of an exogenous stream of government spending
(such as Benhabib and Rustichini (1997), Domínguez (2007), and Aguiar and Amador (2011)).
2Because there is no strategic interation in Tallarinis (2000) model, he is able to compute equilibrium using a
linear-quadratic dynamic programming method.
3Karantounias (2013) performs a related exercise, also using a Lucas and Stokey (1983) model, focusing on
Ramsey equilibria in which the scal authority is paternalistic.
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scal authorities are two special cases of our decision-making framework.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
describes the decision problems facing the households, rms, and the scal authority. Section
3 discusses the models parameterization and derives and discusses the system of equations that
must be solved to compute equilibrium. Section 4 presents the main results while Section
5 examines the sensitivity of the main results to alternative parameterizations of the model.
Section 6 concludes. An appendix presents the numerical method used to compute equilibrium.
2 The model
We consider a production economy populated by a unit-mass of identical atomistic households,
a unit-mass of identical atomistic rms, and a scal authority. Firms rent capital and hire
labor from households and use these inputs to produce goods that are sold to households and the
scal authority. Goods sold to the scal authority are transformed costlessly into a government
consumption good while those sold to households are either consumed or used to augment the
capital stock. The scal authority taxes household income, using the revenue to nance the
provision of the government consumption good. Markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive.
Households and the scal authority are each assumed to be risk-sensitive decisionmakers.
2.1 Households
Households own the capital stock. They receive income by renting their capital and supplying
their labor to rms at prices rkt and wt, respectively. After paying income tax, households use
their remaining income to purchase goods, which they use to o¤set capital-depreciation, to invest
in their capital stock, and to consume. The representative households lifetime utility function
is summarized by
ut = u (ct; lt; Gt) +

h
ln
h
Et

exp

hut+1
i
; (1)
where  2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, h  0 characterizes household risk-sensitivity, ct denotes
private consumption, lt denotes leisure, Gt denotes consumption of government services, and the
momentary utility function u (ct; lt; Gt) is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice
continuously di¤erentiable, and to satisfy the Inada (1963) conditions. A simple application of
LHôpitalsrule shows that equation (1) converges to the standard recursive formulation
ut = u (ct; lt; Gt) + Et (ut+1) ;
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in the limit as h " 0 while the e¤ects of h < 0 are to distort the continuation value, a distortion
arising from the households aversion to risky future utility.
The capital owned by the representative household evolves over time to satisfy the ow budget
constraint
kt+1 + ct = kt + (1   t)
h
rkt   

kt + wtht
i
; (2)
where  2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate,  t > 0 is the tax rate applied to household income (with
a tax-allowance for capital-depreciation), kt is the households stock of capital as of the beginning
of period t, and ht is hours worked. Households maximize their expected lifetime utility, equation
(1), subject to their ow-budget constraint, equation (2), and their time resource constraint
ht + lt = 1; (3)
taking prices, the tax rate, and the provision of government consumption as given.
2.2 Firms
The stand-in aggregate rm employs capital and labor to produce output according to the neo-
classical production technology
Yt = e
ztF (Kt; Ht) ; (4)
where Yt represents aggregate output, Kt denotes the aggregate capital stock as of the beginning
of period t, Ht denotes aggregate hours worked, and zt is an aggregate technology shock that
obeys the law-of-motion
zt+1 = zt + t+1; (5)
where  2 (0; 1) and t  i:i:d:

0; 2

.
Markets for capital and labor are perfectly competitive and clear at the prices
rkt = e
ztFK (Kt; Ht) ; (6)
wt = e
ztF (Kt; Ht)  eztFK (Kt; Ht)Kt; (7)
respectively, with the stand-in aggregate rm making zero-prots in equilibrium.
2.3 Fiscal authority
The scal authority cannot impose lump-sum taxes, but receives revenue by taxing household
income at marginal rate  t > 0. These tax revenues are used to purchase goods from rms
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that are transformed costlessly into government consumption goods (or government services) and
provided to households at zero-unit-cost. The scal authority has no outstanding liabilities and
cannot issue bonds. As a consequence, the scal authoritys decisions about taxation and the
provision of the government consumption good, decisions made to maximize
Ut = u (Ct; Lt; Gt) +

f
ln
h
Et

exp

fUt+1
i
; (8)
where f  0 characterizes the scal-authoritys risk sensitivity, are constrained by the balanced-
budget condition
Gt =  t
h
rkt   

Kt + wtHt
i
: (9)
Importantly, f need not equal h, which allows the scal authority and the representative
household to di¤er in regard to their risk-sensitivity. If f = h, then the scal authority
conducts policy in order to maximize the welfare of the representative household, accounting
for the households risk-sensitivity, (corresponding to Svecs (2012) politicalscal authority),
while if f = 0, then the scal authority conducts policy in order to maximize the welfare of the
representative household, ignoring the households risk-sensitivity, (corresponding to Svecs (2012)
paternalisticscal authority), but more generally the framework allows the scal authority to
be either more or less risk-sensitive than the representative household.
2.4 Information, timing, and aggregation
With the current realization for the aggregate technology given by zt, we denote the history of
realizations for aggregate technology up to and including period t by zt = fzigti=0. Similarly,
using xt =

zt kt Kt
0
to denote the economys state at the beginning of period t, we assume
that at the beginning of period t all agents are endowed with the information set given by the
history xt. After entering period t, and having observed xt, the scal authority makes its decision;
households and rms make their decisions simultaneously, but subsequent to the scal authority.
With this timing protocol, within the period, the scal authority has a rst-mover advantage
with respect to households and rms.4 Our assumptions that households and rms are identical
and that they are of unit-mass implies that Kt = kt, Ct = ct, Ht = ht, and Lt = lt in aggregate.
4This timing protocol is used by Kydland and Prescott (1977), Ambler and Paquet (1997), Klein and Rios-Rull
(2003), Klein, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2005), Ortigueria (2006), Klein, Krusell, and Rios-Rull (2008), Ortigueria,
Pereira, and Pichler (2012), Anderson, Kim, and Yun (2010), and is ubiquitous in the literature on time-consistent
monetary policy. The alternative timing protocol in which households, rms, and the scal authority all make
their decisions simultaneously is considered by Cohen and Michel (1988) and Ortigueira (2006).
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3 Solving the model
To simplify the exposition, we assume from the outset that the momentary utility function for
the representative household is of the iso-elastic form
u (ct; lt; Gt) =
c1 ct
1  c +
l1 lt
1  l +
G
1 g
t
1  g ;
where fc; l; G; ; g > 0 and that the production function is Cobb-Douglas
Yt = e
ztKt H
1 
t ;
where  2 (0; 1), with the aggregate technology shock obeying equation (5).
With the scal authority having a rst-mover advantage within each period, we begin by
formulating the decision problem for the representative household. Using the households time
resource constraint to substitute for leisure, the representative household solves the decision
problem described by the Bellman equation
v (zt; kt) = maxfct;ht;kt+1g
"
c1 ct
1  c +
 (1  ht)1 l
1  l +
G
1 g
t
1  g +

h
ln
h
Et

exp

hv (zt+1; kt+1)
i#
;
(10)
subject to the ow budget constraint
kt+1 = kt + (1   t)
h
rkt   

kt + wtht
i
  ct; (11)
taking rkt , wt, and  t as given, and the initial conditions kt = Kt > 0, zt > 0, known.
From this Bellman equation, and employing the Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) condition,
we obtain rst-order necessary conditions, which after aggregating across identical households and
employing equations (6) (7), can be written as
C ct =

Et

exp
 
hv (zt+1;Kt+1)

Et
h
exp

hv (zt+1;Kt+1)
  
1 + (1   t+1)
 
ezt+1K 1t+1 H
1 
t+1   

C ct+1
i
;(12)
 (1 Ht) l = (1   t) (1  ) eztKt H t C ct : (13)
Equation (12) is, of course, an aggregate version of the consumption Euler equation while equation
(13) summarizes aggregate labor supply. The aggregate capital stock evolves according to
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + eztKt H1 t   Ct  Gt: (14)
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Turning to the scal authority, its decision problem is described by the Bellman equation
V (zt;Kt) = maxfCt;Ht;Gt;Kt+1g
"
C1 ct
1  c +
 (1 Ht)1 l
1  l +
G
1 g
t
1  g +

f
ln
h
Et

exp

fV (zt+1;Kt+1)
i#
;
(15)
with the constraints given by equations (12) (14) and by the government budget constraint,
Gt =  t
 
eztKt H
1 
t   Kt

; (16)
taking next-periods policy function
Gt+1 = G (zt+1;Kt+1) ; (17)
as given.
3.1 Equilibrium
A Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium for this model is a collection of household decision rules
fc (zt; kt) ; h (zt; kt) ; k (zt; kt)g, a collection of aggregate decision rules, fC (zt;Kt) ; H (zt;Kt) ; G (zt;Kt) ;K (zt;Kt)g,
and a collection of value functions, fv (zt; kt) ; V (zt;Kt)g, such that
1. The collection fv (zt; kt) ; c (zt; kt) ; h (zt; kt) ; k (zt; kt)g solves the households decision prob-
lem described by the Bellman equation, equation (10), and the constraint, equation (11).
2. The collection fV (zt;Kt) ; C (zt;Kt) ; H (zt;Kt) ;K (zt;Kt) ; G (zt;Kt)g solves the scal au-
thoritys decision problem described by the Bellman equation, equation (15), and the con-
straints, equations (9), (12) (14), and (17).
3. kt = Kt, C (zt;Kt) = c (zt;Kt), H (zt;Kt) = h (zt;Kt), and k (zt; kt) = K (zt;Kt).
We apply value function iteration to the scal authoritys problem to compute equilibrium,
employing Chebyshev polynomials to approximate the unknown functions; this procedure is sum-
marized in Appendix A.
3.2 Parameterization
Table 1 reports the models benchmark parameterization, where the benchmark is a scal-policy
model in which agents are not risk-sensitive. Accordingly, h and f each equal zero in the
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benchmark model. With the model parameterized to a quarterly frequency, the subjective
discount factor, , is set to 0:99, a standard value for real business cycle models in the absence
of trending technological progress, while  is set to 0:36, implying a capital-share of output that
is just over one-third.
Table 1: Benchmark parameterization of model
Parameter Value Interpretation
 0:36 Capital-share of output
 0:05 Depreciation rate (value is annualized rate)
 0:99 Subjective discount factor
c 1:00 Utility curvature of private consumption
l 1:00 Utility curvature of leisure
g 1:00 Utility curvature of government services
 1:15 Utility weight on leisure
 0:25 Utility weight on government services
h 0:00 Household risk-sensitivity
f 0:00 Fiscal risk-sensitivity
 0:95 Persistence of technology shock
 0:01 Standard deviation of technology shock
Turning to the remaining parameters, the values assigned to most parameters are quite stan-
dard. The elasticities of substitution in the momentary utility function are each assumed to equal
1:00, so that the momentary utility function is linear in logs (consistent with Tallarini (2000)),
while the weights,  and , are chosen so that households spend about 40 percent of their avail-
able (i.e., non-sleeping) time working and so that government spending is around 20 percent of
output. The value for the depreciation rate, , is chosen so that the capital-output ratio is about
12. Finally, the parameters that govern the shock process are also relatively standard, with the
persistence parameter, , set to 0:95 and the standard deviation for the technology innovations,
, set to 0:01.
Although the benchmark model has h = f = 0:00, these parameters are varied between 0:00
and  0:10 in the analysis with risk sensitivity that follows. While apparently small in magnitude,
as we shall see, variations in h and f between 0:00 and  0:10 correspond to relatively large
variations in risk aversion and produce a large precautionary-saving motive.
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4 Results
In this section we solve for the Markov-perfect equilibrium of the benchmark model and for
various specications with risk-sensitive preferences. For each of specication we compute the
stochastic steady state values, standard deviations, and correlations with output, and impulse
responses for the key aggregate variables, and we compute the risk-free rate, the return to equity,
and the equity premium (asset returns and the equity premium are reported in percentage points
per quarter). Our main results are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 and in Figures 1 through 5.
Allowing for risk-sensitive preferences, the net-return on a risk-free one-period real bond is
dened by
1
1 + rt+1
=
Et

exp
 
hv (zt+1;Kt+1)

C ct+1

Et

exp
 
hv (zt+1;Kt+1)

C ct
; (18)
which illustrates the connection between risk-sensitivity and the discount factor, . In the limit
as h " 0, equation (18) simplies to the standard expression with iso-elastic utility. Similarly,
the one-period real return on equity is given by5
ret+1 = e
zt+1K 1t+1 H
1 
t+1   ; (19)
where the e¤ects of risk-sensitivity and income-taxation enter through their impact on capital and
labor. Equation (19) shows that the return on equity is a decreasing function of the capital-labor
ratio.
The deterministicsteady state results reported in Table 2 correspond to the steady state in a
Markov-perfect equilibrium of a nonstochastic version of the benchmark model. However, because
risk-sensitivity generates no risk-adjustment when the model is nonstochastic, the deterministic
steady state is the same for all specications. Allowing the model to be stochastic, but keeping
the two risk-sensitivity parameters, h and f , equal to zero, leads to a stochastic steady state
in which capital is slightly higher than in the deterministic model (comparing columns 2 and
3). Although capital is higher on average, this does not translate into higher output. Instead,
output falls slightly as households lower their supply of labor. Looking at how output is allocated,
investment remains relatively unchanged, but a larger share of output is allocated to personal
consumption and a smaller share of output is allocated to government services. It follows from
5An alternative, equivalent, expression for the one-period real return on equity is ret+1 =
Kt+1+(ezt+1Kt+1H
1 
t+1  It+1)
Kt+1
, where the term in brackets corresponds to the dividend payment.
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Table 2 that the benevolent scal authority responds to uncertainty by lowering the income tax
rate. The level of the equity premium is due almost entirely to the fact that the returns to equity
are subject to income tax.
Table 2: The e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on the steady state
Variable Deterministic h = f = 0 h =  0:1; f = 0 h = f =  0:1
Output 1:805 1:802 1:987 1:986
Consumption 1:183 1:189 1:256 1:257
Government 0:299 0:290 0:331 0:330
Investment 0:323 0:324 0:399 0:399
Labor 0:404 0:402 0:416 0:416
Tax rate 0:196 0:196 0:209 0:208
Capital 25:832 25:912 31:919 31:928
Risk-free return 1:010 1:010 0:785 0:784
Equity return 1:265 1:255 0:992 0:991
Equity premium 0:255 0:245 0:207 0:206
Introducing households with risk-sensitive preferences, but retaining f = 0 (corresponding
to a paternalistic scal authority), leads to substantive changes in the stochastic steady state.
In particular, comparing columns 3 and 4 in Table 2 it is evident that risk-sensitivity produces
a strong precautionary-saving motive and raises capital in steady state from 25:912 to 31:919,
an increase of almost 25 percent. Although hours-worked do rise, the large increase in capital
raises considerably the capital-labor ratio, pushing down both the risk-free rate and the return to
equity. With capital and labor both rising, the steady state value for output also rises, with this
increase in output allocated disproportionately to consumption and, to a lesser extent, investment.
Although government spending increases in steady state, it declines as a share of output, signalling
a fall in the income tax rate. Thus, the paternalistic scal authoritys response to risk-sensitive
households is to lower the income tax rate, supporting the households desire to increase capital
and facilitating a substitution away from government services and toward private consumption.
Turning to the case in which the scal authority is political (f = h), it is evident, through
comparing columns 4 and 5, that the steady state outcomes are largely una¤ected by the scal
authoritys risk-sensitivity.
Where the analysis above considered steady state outcomes, we now investigate the e¤ect that
risk-sensitivity has on decision rules, specically on the households decision rules for consumption
and labor, and on the scal authoritys decision rules for government spending and the tax rate.
We report the decision rules in Figure 1, displaying them as a function of the capital stock
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only. This is achieved by numerically integrating with respect to the technology shock in order
to compute the conditional expectations E[C (zt;Kt) jKt], E[G (zt;Kt) jKt], E[ (zt;Kt) jKt], and
E[H (zt;Kt) jKt].
Figure 1: The e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on decision rules
Looking at the households consumption decision rule shown in Figure 1, panel A, two results
are apparent. First, although risk-sensitivity has a large impact on the consumption decision
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rule, it is the households risk-sensitivity that matters not the scal authoritys. Second, the
e¤ect of risk sensitivity on the consumption decision rule is to lower the marginal propensity to
consume out of wealth (capital), as reected in the fact that the risk-sensitive decision rules have
slightly atter slopes than the benchmark decision rule. By consuming less from their wealth,
a precautionary saving e¤ect induced by risk-sensitivity, households increase their saving, and
with the goods saved allocated to investment the outcome is higher capital in equilibrium (as
shown in Table 1, above, and in Figure 2, below). The households labor decision rule (panel
B) is also a¤ected materially by the households risk-sensitivity (and not much by the scal
authoritys risk sensitivity), with the risk-sensitivity raising the households supply of labor for
each level of capital. Accordingly, the households aversion to risky future utility leads it to
increase hours-worked in order to increase savings and thereby boost expected future income.
Turning to the scal authoritys decision rule for government spending (panel C), unlike
consumption and labor, neither the households risk-sensitivity nor the scal authoritys risk-
sensitivity has much e¤ect on the decision rule for government spending. To the extent that there
is an e¤ect, it is to raise government spending at each level of capital. Thus, although muted, the
scal authority seeks to address the decline in private consumption and the rise in hours-worked
with an increase in government services. The response is greater for the paternalisticscal
authority than for the political scal authority. Although the e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on
government spending appear to be small, the e¤ects on the tax rate (Panel D) are somewhat
larger, with increasing risk-sensitivity lowering the tax rate schedule. By lowering the tax rate
schedule the government assists households in accumulating capital, which provides a bu¤er
against the risk that households fear.
Where Table 2 presented information about (stochastic) steady state outcomes, Figure 2
presents the unconditional densities of the key variables. We construct these unconditional den-
sities by simulating data from each model, linearly interpolating over capital and the technology
shock.
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Figure 2: The e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on the asymptotic equilibrium
The densities in Figure 2 reinforce the results in Table 2 and Figure 1. Not only does the
scal authoritys risk-sensitivity have little e¤ect on decision rules or steady state outcomes, but it
has little e¤ect on the entire distribution of outcomes, with consumption and government services
providing modest exceptions. Figure 2, panel A, shows that the scal authoritys risk-sensitivity
impacts the density for consumption when consumption is low while panels B and F show that
13
the scal authoritys paternalism shifts the densities for government spending and the tax rate
systematically to the right. The households risk-sensitivity, on the other hand, has a large
impact on the densities of all variables. Notably, however, although some changes in volatility
can be discerned (and are reported in Table 3 below), Figure 2 makes clear that the principle
e¤ect of the households risk-sensitivity falls on the mean of each variable.
The e¤ect that risk-sensitivity has on the business cycle is examined in Table 3, which fo-
cuses on volatilities and correlations, and in Figures 3 and 4, which focus on impulse responses
to positive and negative technology shocks, respectively. The benchmark results in Table 3
indicate that private consumption is less volatile than output, that investment is considerably
more volatile than output, that the volatility of government spending is about equal to that of
private consumption, and that these variables, and labor, are all strongly positively correlated
with output.
Table 3: The e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on the business cycle
Benchmark h =  0:1; f = 0 h = f =  0:1
Log-variable, Xt s:d:(%)  (Yt; Xt) s:d:(%)  (Yt; Xt) s:d:(%)  (Yt; Xt)
Output 0:0581 1:0000 0:0545 1:0000 0:0546 1:0000
Consumption 0:0428 0:9161 0:0404 0:9179 0:0404 0:9171
Government 0:0418 0:8922 0:0378 0:8867 0:0376 0:8851
Investment 0:1707 0:8724 0:1415 0:8882 0:1415 0:8877
Labor 0:0239 0:8755 0:0209 0:8694 0:0210 0:8688
Allowing households and/or the scal authority to be risk-sensitive has little e¤ect on the
volatilities and correlations reported in Table 3, a nding that is consistent with Tallarini (2000).
To the extent that risk-sensitivity does impact these statistics it serves to lower the volatility of
all variables, but most noticeably the volatility of government services and investment. This
result makes intuitive sense, because risk-sensitive households are averse to volatility and their
aversion induces them to employ decision rules that mitigate volatility.6
Figures 3 and 4 display how the key variables respond following a one-standard-deviation
shock to aggregate technology; Figure 3 displays responses to a positive shock while Figure 4
displays the responses to a negative shock. In response to a positive technology shock, Figure 3
shows that the benchmark model responds to the improved technology with a rise in investment
6At the same time, risk-sensitivity also raises slightly each variables correlation with output, which, particularly
in regard to labor, worsens the models ability to account for the correlations in the data (as reported in Hansen,
1985, for example). Mechanisms such as indivisable labor (Hansen, 1985) and/or variable capital utilization
(Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Hu¤man, 1988) are likely to improve the model along this dimension.
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(panel D) and labor (panel E), rises brought about through the higher marginal productivity of
capital and labor, which raises output (panel A). With the technology shock lifting household
income, households increase their demand for private consumption (panel B), government services
(panel D), and leisure.7 The tax rate (Panel F), declines immediately following the shock, with
the scal authority allocating the benets of increased income partly through higher government
spending and partly through lower taxation. Relative to the responses for the benchmark model,
the e¤ects of risk sensitivity can be seen largely to lower the responses of private consumption
and government services to the shock, consistent with the declines in volatility reported in Table
3.
7 In equilibrium, however, the households demand for increased leisure is dominated by the substitution e¤ect by
which households are induced by a higher real wage rate to increase their supply of labor. This result is standard
in real business cycle models.
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Figure 3: Responses to a positive technology shock (1 s.d.)
Of greater interest are the di¤erences in how the various specications respond to positive
and negative technology shocks. From Figure 4 it is clear, rst, that the economy responds
asymmetrically to positive and negative technology shocks and, second, that the e¤ects of risk-
sensitivity on the model are considerably more pronounced when the technology shock is negative
than when it is positive. The nding that risk-sensitivity matters more for negative shocks
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makes sense when the households risk-sensitivity is interpreted from a robust control perspective,
because this perspective argues that households and the political scal authority should design
their decision rules in order to guard against a worst-case shock process.
Figure 4: Responses to a negative technology shock (1 s.d.)
Interestingly, relative to the benchmark responses, with risk-sensitive preferences the declines
in labor, investment, government spending, and output are all damped on the impact of the
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(adverse) technology shock. As a consequence, the medium-term decline in capital is also less
than that for the benchmark model, which facilitates higher private consumption and higher
government spending.
The remainder of this section explores the e¤ect that risk-sensitive preferences have on the
risk-free rate, on the return to equity, and on the equity premium, focusing on the case where
the economy is populated by a politicalscal authority (h = f ). The return on each asset,
and the resulting equity premium, are calculated two ways. First we calculate returns holding
the discount factor, , constant at 0:99, while varying the risk-sensitivity parameters, h = f ,
between 0 and  0:1. Second, recognizing that the stochastic steady state varies with movements
in the risk-sensitivity parameters, we next calculate returns varying h = f between 0 and  0:1,
while adjusting the discount factor, , in order to keep the stochastic steady state for capital
unchanged from its benchmark value ( adjusted). The results are shown in Figure 5, where the
asset-returns and the equity premium are plotted against the absolute value of the risk-sensitivity
parameters.
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Figure 5: The e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on annualized asset returns and the equity
premium
Considering rst the asset-returns calculated keeping the discount factor equal to 0:99, while
the level of the equity premium is driven by the tax on capital income, it is clear from Figure 5 that
the e¤ect of risk-sensitivity is to lower the risk-free rate (panel A), lower the real return on equity
(panel B), and to lower the equity premium (panel C). These results arise largely from the increase
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in the stochastic steady state value for capital that occurs as households become increasingly risk
sensitive. As described above, we counteract this increase in steady state capital by adjusting
the discount factor, and report the ( adjusted) results in Figure 5 alongside those where  is
kept constant. When the discount factor is adjusted to keep unchanged the models stochastic
steady state for capital, the e¤ects of risk sensitivity are to lower slightly the risk-free rate, raise
slightly the return to equity, and to raise slightly the equity premium. The results in Figure
5 are consistent with Tallarini (2000) and they suggest that although risk-sensitive preferences
may be able to account for a low risk-free rate, that additional mechanisms, such as long-run
consumption risk arising through permanent technology shocks, or more importantly, and capital
adjustment costs, as per Croce (2006), are needed to explain the equity premium.
5 Sensitivity analysis
The previous section examined the e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on asset returns, the business cycle,
and the conduct of scal policy under the assumption that the momentary utility function was
linear in logs, i.e., under the assumption that c = l = g = 1. In this section we briey
investigate whether the main ndings of that section are sensitive to alternative values for these
parameters. To be specic, we now consider the models behavior in equilibria in which there is
no risk-sensitivity (h = f = 0), in which the scal authority is paternalistic (h =  0:1; f = 0),
and in which the scal authority is political (h = f =  0:1) for parameterizations in which,
alternately, c = 5, l = 2, and g = 5. Of interest is not whether the model behaves di¤erently
when the curvature parameters are changed, but whether these curvature paramters materially
interact with risk-sensitivity. The results are summarized in Table 4, which reports the stochastic
steady state outcomes for the various specications and complements Table 2.
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Table 4: Stochastic steady state outcomes: Sensitivity analysis
No risk-sensitivity Paternalistic Political
Variable c = 5 l = 2 g = 5 c = 5 l = 2 g = 5 c = 5 l = 2 g = 5
Output 1:649 1:347 1:958 1:728 1:496 2:340 1:726 1:495 2:340
Consumption 1:037 0:888 0:947 1:047 0:942 1:105 1:047 0:943 1:106
Government 0:322 0:217 0:719 0:299 0:251 0:778 0:354 0:250 0:776
Investment 0:289 0:242 0:292 0:325 0:302 0:458 0:325 0:302 0:458
Labor 0:373 0:300 0:485 0:376 0:312 0:497 0:375 0:312 0:497
Tax rate 0:237 0:197 0:433 0:254 0:211 0:415 0:253 0:210 0:413
Capital 23:133 19:371 23:325 26:024 24:176 36:609 26:012 24:181 36:642
Risk-free return 1:006 1:010 1:009 0:852 0:772 0:617 0:852 0:772 0:617
Equity return 1:317 1:255 1:775 1:142 0:978 1:052 1:140 0:977 1:050
Equity premium 0:311 0:245 0:767 0:290 0:206 0:435 0:288 0:205 0:434
The ndings in Table 4 are consistent with those in Table 2. In particular, for each value
for the curvature parameters in the momentary utility function the introduction of risk-sensitive
households has a large e¤ect on the stochastic steady state outcomes, largely through its impact
on capital accumulation. However, although household risk-sensitivity a¤ects importantly the
stochastic steady state, whether the scal authority is risk-sensitive or not is largely immaterial,
as seen in the fact that the statistics for the political scal authority are almost identical to those
for the paternalistic scal authority.
Focusing now on the specication for which c = 5, Table 5 reports the volatilities and
correlations with output of the key variables.
Table 5: The e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on the business cycle when c = 5
No risk-sensitivity Paternalistic Political
Log-variable, Xt s:d:(%)  (Yt; Xt) s:d:(%)  (Yt; Xt) s:d:(%)  (Yt; Xt)
Output 0:0371 1:0000 0:0364 1:0000 0:0363 1:0000
Consumption 0:0121 0:9315 0:0118 0:9338 0:0118 0:9335
Government 0:0556 0:9025 0:0525 0:9050 0:0525 0:9042
Investment 0:1240 0:9357 0:1119 0:9395 0:1119 0:9396
Labor 0:0159  0:3274 0:0152  0:3368 0:0152  0:3362
The results in Table 5 conrm those for the benchmark parameterization examined in section
4. Regardless of whether either households and/or the scal authority are risk-sensitive, the
volatilities of the key variables and their correlations with output are largely una¤ected. And to
the extent that they are a¤ected, the e¤ect of risk-sensitivity is to lower volatility and raise the
correlations with output. Clearly, in keeping with the benchmark parameterization, the presence
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of risk-sensitivity has important e¤ects on the stochastic steady state, but negligible e¤ects on
the business cycle.
6 Conclusion
This paper examined the e¤ects of risk-sensitivity on the business cycle, scal policy, and asset
returns in a Markov-perfect equilibrium. Our model is one in which a scal authority must use a
linear income tax to nance optimally a government consumption good, while lacking the ability to
commit and the ability to bond-nance scal decits. Further, our model assumes that households
and the scal authority are risk-sensitive decisionmakers. This model extends the work of
Ortigueira (2006), Klein, Krusell, and Ríos-Rull (2008), and Martin (2010) by introducing risk-
sensitivity and aggregate uncertainty and it extends the work of Tallarini (2000) by introducing
a risk-sensitive scal authority, and by focusing on Markov-perfect equilibria that are computed
using a global method.
We nd that household risk-sensitivity produces a powerful precautionary-saving motive,
which raises importantly the stochastic steady state level of capital. However, although house-
hold risk-sensitivity e¤ects the stochastic steady state, its e¤ects on economic volatility are small.
Furthermore, we nd that while risk-sensitivity has relatively little e¤ect on how the economy
responds to positive technology shocks, its e¤ects for the case of negative technology shocks are
much larger. In addition, due to its e¤ect on capitals stochastic steady state, we nd that in-
creases in household risk-sensitivity serve to lower the risk-free rate, the return to equity, and the
equity premium. However, holding the stochastic steady state constant, increases in household
risk-sensitivity lower the risk-free rate slightly, raise the return to equity slightly, and increase
the equity premium. In regard to the scal authority, somewhat surprisingly, the key nding
is that the models behavior is qualitatively and quantitatively una¤ected by whether the scal
authority is risk-sensitive or not.
Although it extends existing work in important dimensions, the model that we have analyzed
could feasibly be made still more sophisticated. In future work, we plan to examine whether risk-
sensitivity matters more for scal policy, asset prices, and the business cycle in models containing
features such as variable capital utilization, capital-adjustment costs, monopolistic competition,
investment-specic technology shocks, and permanent technology shocks.
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Appendix: Computing equilibrium
To compute the Markov-perfect equilibrium we approximate six objects: the process for technol-
ogy; the decision rules for consumption, labor, and government spending, and the value functions
for the household and the scal authority. Drawing on Tauchen (1986), we approximate the
autoregressive process for technology with a nite-state Markov chain with nz nodes, fzjgn
z
j=1.
Unlike Tauchen (1986), however, our nodes for technology are not spaced uniformly, but deter-
mined as the roots of a Gauss-Hermite polynomial. To approximate the decision rules and value
functions we employ Chebyshev polynomials. Thus, we form the approximations
bC (zt;Kt) = nzX
j=1
nkX
i=0
wcij i (Kt) ; (20)
bH (zt;Kt) = nzX
j=1
nkX
i=0
whij i (Kt) ; (21)
bG (zt;Kt) = nzX
j=1
nkX
i=0
wgij i (Kt) ; (22)
bV (zt;Kt) = nzX
j=1
nkX
i=0
wVij i (Kt) ; (23)
bv (zt;Kt) = nzX
j=1
nkX
i=0
wvij i (Kt) ; (24)
where  i (Kt) represents the ith order Chebyshev polynomial in aggregate capital, nk represents
the order of the Chebyshev polynomial in aggregate capital, and wcij , w
h
ij , w
g
ij , w
v
ij , and w
V
ij
represent the Chebyshev weights employed in each approximation. Notice that equations (20)
(22) exploit the discretization of the technology shock, treating technology as a shifter whose
e¤ects are reected in the weights assigned to the polynomials.
Now, employing equations (20) (22), we use Tauchens method to compute the conditional
expectation for each node (zt;Kt), and solve for the x-point of the system
C ct =

Et

exp
 
hbv (zt+1;Kt+1)
Et
264exp  hbv (zt+1;Kt+1)bC (zt+1;Kt+1)c
0B@ 1 +

1  bG(zt+1;Kt+1)
eztKt+1
bH(zt+1;Kt+1)1  Kt+1



ezt+1K 1t+1 bH (zt+1;Kt+1)1    
1CA
375 ;
 (1 Ht) l =

1  Gt
eztKt H
1 
t   Kt

(1  ) eztKt H t C ct ;
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + eztKt H1 t   Ct  Gt;
yielding the (approximate) aggregate reaction functions for consumption, C (zt;Kt; Gt), and labor,
H (zt;Kt; Gt). With the aggregate reaction functions for consumption and labor in hand, we now
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turn to the Bellman equation for the scal authority, which using equation (23), is approximated
by
V (zt;Kt) = maxfGt;Kt+1g
24 C(zt;Kt;Gt)1 c 11 c + (1 H(zt;Kt;Gt))1 l1 l + G1 gt  11 g
+Et
hbV (zt+1;Kt+1)i
35 ; (25)
subject to
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + eztKt H (zt;Kt; Gt)1    C (zt;Kt; Gt) Gt: (26)
Substituting equation (26) into the Bellman equation, we use Newton-Raphson to maxi-
mize V (zt;Kt) with respect to Gt, computing the conditional expectation in equation (25) using
Tauchens method, with this maximization giving rise to the policy rule for government spend-
ing G (zt;Kt) and the associated value function V (zt;Kt). Using G (zt;Kt) and the reaction
functions for consumption and labor we compute the approximate decision rules bC (zt;Kt) andbH (zt;Kt). With these updated decision rules for consumption and labor and equation (24) we
compute the households value function according to the Bellman equation
v (zt;Kt) =
C (zt;Kt)
1 c   1
1  c +
 (1 H (zt;Kt))1 l
1  l +
G
1 g
t   1
1  g +Et [bv (zt+1;Kt+1)] : (27)
By construction, v (zt;Kt) = v (zt; kt).
The weights in the Chebyshev polynomials are determined using Chebyshev-regression with
capital constrained to the interval Kt 2 [20; 40] for the benchmark parameterization. To solve the
model under its benchmark parameterization we set nz = 5 and nk = 9. We use 50 solution nodes
for the capital stock where these solution nodes are determined from the roots of a Chebyshev
polynomial.
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